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THE GREAT PENSION GRAB: 
COMMENTS ON RICHARD IPPOLITO, 
BANKRUPTCY AND WORKERS: RISKS, 
COMPENSATION AND PENSION CONTRACTS 
MARGARET M. BLAIR* 
I want to thank Joel Seligman, Troy Paredes and Dan Keating for 
putting this conference together and for inviting me. I am not an expert on 
bankruptcy, so this is a great learning opportunity for me and it has been a 
terrific experience to be able to just absorb what is going on in this field. 
I am pleased to comment on Richard Ippolito’s Article,1 which takes on 
several important ideas that I think deserve more attention from academic 
researchers. Ippolito models and attempts to assign a value to assets that 
employees have at risk in their employer firms.2 Second, he documents 
and proposes to explain the significant changes that we have seen in the 
last two decades in the terms on which corporations provide pension 
benefits to their employees, when they provide them at all. Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, the Article documents some of the changes in 
the degree to which employees today are actually bearing substantial risk 
in connection with the business enterprises that they work for than they 
have historically. 
I will start with a discussion of Ippolito’s explanation of the changes in 
the pension plans and then make some comments on the significance of 
the fact that employees have become substantial risk bearers in 
corporations. Ippolito’s paper documents that in 1998 only 16% of 
working people in the United States were covered by traditional defined-
benefit pension plans. This was down from 38% in 1980. The overall 
percentage of working people who are covered by some form of pension 
plan has also declined. It was 54% in 1980 and it was down to 52% in 
1998. Although small, that decline happened despite the fact that we had 
substantial aging of the population during that period, as well as an 
increase in the share of the workforce in full-time employment.3 So the 
 * Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. 
 1. Richard A. Ippolito, Bankruptcy and Workers: Risks, Compensation and Pension Contracts, 
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1251 (2004). 
 2. Id.; see also MARGARET MENDENHALL BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 263–67 (1995) (discussing attempts by 
labor economists to measure investments in firm-specific human capital). 
 3. See FRANK HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN 
THE 20TH CENTURY 51–59 & 56 fig. 2.4 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/ 
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fact that the proportion of people that are covered by any kind of pension 
benefits declined at all is surprising when you think about it in the context 
of demographic changes that have been underway. 
More significantly the proportion of workers who are explicitly bearing 
the investment risk in their pension plans has increased dramatically from 
about 8% in 1980 to 32% in 1998.4 Ippolito documents that even within 
the category of defined contribution plans, the riskiness of the employee 
pension plans has increased because defined contribution plans are 
typically not optimally diversified: a large share of plan portfolios are 
invested in the stock or other securities of the employer. 
One thing these changes suggest to me—which is not directly related to 
Ippolito’s Article, but I cannot resist the opportunity to point out—is that it 
would be really bad public policy to “reform” Social Security in ways that 
have the effect of moving people into defined-contribution types of 
arrangements. We already have a large share of workers who are bearing 
an enormous amount of risk in their pension plans and they do not appear 
to be optimally diversified as it is. 
Ippolito’s explanation for this change in risk bearing for pension plans 
in the mid–1980s is that the federal government changed the rules for 
pension plans regulated under the Employee Retirement and Income 
Security Act (ERISA), and in the process made it possible for employers 
to unilaterally terminate their pension plans and suck the surplus assets in 
these plans back out of the plan and into the corporate coffers. 
The polite word for this is “reversion.” It appears to me that the 
combination of the pension benefit guarantee insurance, which was put in 
place in 1974 for all contributions made to regulated defined-benefit 
retirement plans since 1974,5 plus granting firms the right to unilaterally 
terminate plans and allow reversions of surpluses, has had the effect of 
giving corporate employers both a put option and a call option that, 
together, dramatically reduce the risk born by the corporation or born 
through the corporation by shareholders and other investors. The reason is 
that when the returns on the pension portfolio are low, the corporation can 
“put” the pension assets to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
censr-4.pdf (showing the growth in the proportion of the population that is composed of older workers 
and retirees); see also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR 
FORCE: A DATABOOK 52 tbl.18 (2004), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook.pdf 
(showing the increasing share of women in full-time employment since 1970, offset somewhat, but not 
completely, by a decline of the share of working men who are in full-time employment). 
 4. Ippolito, supra note 1, at fig.12. 
 5. See 29 U.S.C. § 1461(a) (2000) (Sept. 2, 1974 was the first day that pension insurance took 
effect under ERISA.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/2
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(“PBGC”), forcing it, rather than the employer, to satisfy the employer’s 
promised pension obligations. But if the return on a pension portfolio is 
unusually high, the corporation can terminate the plan and call back the 
surplus value in that plan. Thus the employer gets the benefit of the upside 
potential of what they invest in the pension portfolio. But they have 
offloaded the downside risk onto the PBGC and to the employees. 
Consider the implications of this over time. In the 1980s, the discount 
rates used by corporations to determine what the present value of their 
pension obligations were, relative to the present value of the pension fund 
assets, were unusually high because of the high real interest rates of that 
period.6 As a result, corporations were more likely to find that the value of 
their portfolio investments had a tendency to be higher than the value of 
their obligation because high real interest rates imply a high discount rate, 
which has the effect of reducing the present value of the obligations.7 
Then, in the 1990s, stock market prices rose dramatically.8 To the extent 
that corporate pension plans were invested in corporate securities, they 
likely participated in that run up of security values. Thus, throughout the 
1990s we had another extended period in which there was more likely to 
be surplus value in pension plans than there would be under ordinary 
circumstances. The only way that the companies could get access to these 
surplus assets was to exercise their “call option” and terminate their plans.9 
Apparently, many companies in fact did this, terminating the plans and 
capturing the surplus back for the corporation.10 Ippolito notes that many 
companies that terminated their pension plans, promptly replaced the plans 
with defined contribution plans and he suggests that defined benefit plans 
were not terminated because the companies were experiencing dire 
financial circumstances. Instead they were terminated simply to take 
advantage of the high “option value” in the plans. 
 6. Using the Fisher Equation, the real rate of interest is the nominal rate minus the inflation rate. 
Before 1981, and more recently, real rates have tended to fall within the 2%–3% range. During the 
1980s, 7%–8% rates were typical. See U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT: ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, 2004 (STATISTICAL TABLES) tbl.B-63 & tbl.B-
73 (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/erp.html#erp5 [hereinafter 
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT] (giving data on the CPI to gauge inflation and the prime rate 
to gauge the nominal interest rates). 
 7. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALY ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 62–65 (3d 
ed. 2001). 
 8. From 1990 to 2000 the S&P 500 index climbed from 334.59 to 1427.22 points. See 
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at tbl.B-95. 
 9. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082–1083 (2000) (stating minimum pension funding standards, as well as 
waiver of minimum funding standards and amortization of payments authorized by statute). 
 10. Ippolito, supra note 1, at 1278–83. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Ippolito models the value of the pension funds to the employees. He 
compares the value of funds that are insured to the value of funds that are 
uninsured and he observes that, once corporations have the right to 
terminate their plans even when they are not in financial distress, this has 
the effect of reducing the value of the defined benefit plans to employees 
because now there is a greater risk that the plan will be terminated even 
when it is “in the money,” and in fact, especially when it is “in the 
money.” 
Ippolito’s model demonstrates that if employees are risk-averse, risky 
pension plans may be a very costly way to compensate them. He assumes, 
on the basis of his model that the change in employer policy had the effect 
of increasing the riskiness of defined-benefit plans for the employees and 
therefore reducing the value of those plans to employees because 
employees are risk averse. But he then concludes, without direct evidence, 
that the decline in value to employees must have exceeded the amount 
employers saved by the policy change. This, he says, explains why 
employers switched to defined contribution plans. However, giving 
employers reversion rights should also have reduced the cost of defined-
benefit plans to employers substantially, because now they have a call 
option on the upside value in a defined-benefit plan whereas they have no 
similar “call option” value on the upside potential of defined-contribution 
plans. So Ippolito’s story does not necessarily explain why companies 
would switch to defined contribution plans. He might be right, but I need 
more evidence to be convinced that this is the explanation for the switch to 
defined contribution plans. 
Unless there is a rule that says once you have terminated the defined 
benefit plan you can not turn around and start another one, then it seems to 
me that it would make sense for employers to terminate defined benefit 
plans whenever the call value is high and then start another defined benefit 
plan.11 
This analysis suggests a real puzzle: why would corporations, 
especially corporations that are trying to maximize value for shareholders, 
find it attractive to push risk off to their employees, if employers in fact 
must compensate employees for that additional risk? Surely shareholders 
are much more efficient risk bearers than employees. So an optimal 
contract, As Ippolito’s own model suggests, would remove risk from the 
 11. The Department of Labor, which regulates defined-benefit plans, has apparently imposed 
some limits on employees’ abilities to do this. See News Release, Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation, ERISA Agencies Announce Implementation Guidelines on Asset Reversions (May 23, 
1984), at http://www.pbgc.gov/plan_admin/termpol/erisa.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/2
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employees and put the risk onto the shareholders who are in a position to 
diversify and bear more of the risk. Ippolito implies that giving employees 
a less-risky benefit would enable employers to pay less in the way of other 
compensation. 
I think the answer to this puzzle may be hidden by the fact that there is 
an assumption built into the model Ippolito is using that produces this 
result. This is the assumption that the total compensation of employees is, 
in fact, exogenously determined, so that any loss in value of the pension to 
employees due to the increased riskiness of the pension plans must be 
made up in higher salary or other compensation.12 
The assumption is a convenient one because it prevents Ippolito from 
having to get into the question of whether there was some redistribution of 
value from employees to shareholders and whether there is a fairness or 
equity question to be considered about employers doing this. Because he 
assumes that the employees are compensated somewhere else for the 
increase in risk, he does not question whether there was some external 
change in the terms of trade that has allowed employers to systematically 
redistribute cost and risk away from capital and onto labor in recent 
decades. He assumes, in effect, that the employer’s decision comes down 
to choosing the compensation package that meets the workers minimum 
compensation demands. No value can be simply usurped from employees 
according to Ippolito’s assumptions because, if value is taken from one 
pocket, it must be put back into employees’ pockets somewhere else in the 
compensation package. 
Ippolito provides no empirical evidence for this assumption but I would 
like to see some evidence of it, if it exists. I find the assumption very 
questionable. I think the assumption is actually contradicted by the internal 
logic of Ippolito’s own model. This brings me to the second point I want 
to make about Ippolito’s Article. Employees, as Ippolito points out, have 
both pension assets and firm-specific human capital at risk in the corporate 
enterprise. I am using the term “firm-specific human capital” the same 
way Ippolito uses it—to mean the value of a lifetime job at a current 
employment minus the present value of the next best alternative. It is the 
value an employee gets by staying put and not losing her job versus what 
 12. Ippolito makes this assumption in reverse:  
Workers do not obtain pensions for free. They sacrifice cash wages in exchange for the 
pension promise. . . . If one starts with the assumption that workers sacrifice wages . . . to 
obtain a pension with certainty, then they require a rebate . . . in consideration of accepting 
the risk that they might receive a lesser amount upon bankruptcy [of the employer]. 
See Ippolito supra note 1, at 1257. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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she would have to take in her second best employment. Ippolito seems to 
agree that this is positive and it is nontrivial. 
I would like to suggest, however, that it is more than nontrivial. One of 
the things Ippolito says is that the pattern of asset accumulation and risk 
bearing in one’s pension plan has a curving shape where the risk is low at 
the beginning and low at the end, but high in mid-employment. That same 
pattern applies to the risk of loss of firm-specific human capital, except 
that the firm-specific human capital component, I have some reason to 
believe, is typically several times the value of the pension assets at risk. 
My basis for believing that the value of firm-specific human capital at 
risk in most corporations is quite large comes from empirical studies that 
have shown that displaced workers who lose their jobs through no fault of 
their own—as through plant closings, for example—find that their next 
best alternative jobs pay about 10% to 15% less.13 This means that an 
employee who gets laid off loses an asset that had been generating about 
10-15% of his income each year. That asset just disappears.14 
I do not know what the typical contribution of employers to employee 
pension plans is, but my guess is that it is much smaller than 10% to 15% 
of the employees’ wages. Say, for example, it is 5% of employee wages. 
Then suppose that the present value of the average at-risk pension benefit 
is, say $50,000. By comparison, the asset that employees may lose if they 
lose their firm-specific human capital is two to three times as much: 
$100,000 to $150,000. 
So I think employees need to be added to Professor LoPucki’s list of 
residual-risk bearers.15 Employees are important residual-risk bearers in 
corporations not only for firms in bankruptcy but for firms that are going 
concerns. 
I should let Ippolito speak for himself, but my guess is that he will 
respond that employees obviously must be paid some fair rate of return 
and so we have to assume that in the long run equilibrium they are going 
to be compensated if they have to bear more risk. But my answer is that 
the variance around this equilibrium rate of return, both for employees and 
 13. See BLAIR, supra note 2, 265 nn.38–42; see also Robert C. Topel, Specific Capital and 
Unemployment: Measuring the Costs and Consequences of Job Loss, in STUDIES IN LABOR 
ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALTER Y. OI 118–214 (Allan H. Meltzer & Charles I. Plosser eds., 1990) 
(finding that, in a large sample of workers who had lost their jobs through business closings and 
layoffs in the mid 1980s, the average worker earned 14% less on his next job). 
 14. See supra note 13 and sources cited therein. 
 15. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, 82 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1341 (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/2
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for shareholders, is very high. We know it is high for shareholders16 and I 
suspect that it is extremely high for employees also. So, in essence, what is 
happening is that at any given corporation, at any given moment, there 
may be a common pool of economic “rents,” or “quasi-rents” if you want 
to get technical about it. This pool of rents is up for grabs in a corporation 
at any time. Sometimes employees get “supernormal” returns, and 
sometimes shareholders get “supernormal” returns, and sometimes both 
do. 
As a consequence, in practice, the variance is so high that one cannot 
really determine over any given month or year whether any particular 
group of employees or any particular group of shareholders are being 
“fairly compensated.” Rather, we should more realistically understand that 
we have a total pool of assets, and it is simply up for grabs, and whoever 
has power in a given situation can grab a bigger piece of it. The 
significance of this understanding of how rents are shared in corporate 
enterprises is that there is nearly always a lot of room for employees to 
take more than their long-run equilibrium competitive return, at the 
expense of shareholders. In addition, there is always the opposite 
possibility that shareholders can take more than their long-run equilibrium 
competitive return, at the expense of employees. 
The big difference is that in the field of law and economics we have a 
huge body of literature and legal analysis that is concerned with the 
problem of employees taking more than their appropriate or “fair” share. 
In fact, we have a special name for this problem: we call it a “principal 
agent” problem.17 And we refer to the costs to shareholders from 
employees taking more than their share, or the costs that are imposed on 
shareholders from trying to prevent employees from taking more than their 
fair share, as “agency costs.”18 
We do not have a similar name for, and there is almost no literature on, 
the problem of shareholders taking more than their fair share. In fact most 
corporate law scholars who have been trained in jurisprudence of law and 
economics do not even recognize the latter as a problem.19 This is because 
 16. See BREALY ET AL., supra note 7, at 267–72 (where the standard deviation of common stocks 
is cited as 20.3, compared to 3.2 for Treasury bills and 9.2 for long-term government bonds). 
 17. The literature on agency problems in the theory of the firm is enormous, going back to 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). See also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A 
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 247 n.1 (1999) (listing some of the 
principle articles in that literature). 
 18. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 17. 
 19. See Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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we have assumed that employees are protected by contract and that 
shareholders are the only residual-risk bearers. If we assume that 
employees always get their equilibrium level of total compensation as 
Ippolito has done, whether it comes in the form of pension benefits or 
wages or any other type of compensation, this just contributes to the 
tendency of law and economics scholars to assume away the problem of 
capital getting more than its fair share of corporate rents at the expense of 
employees. 
I see no evidence in Ippolito’s Article that convinces me that, in fact, 
employees have been compensated for the additional pension risks they 
now bear under the new defined-contribution plans. Instead, I think there 
were some macroeconomic shifts in which power shifted from labor to 
capital, somewhere around the early 1980s, and that we are still playing 
that shift out. Capital has successfully grabbed a larger share of total 
output for most of the last 25 years, and employees, implicitly, lost what 
capital gained.20 I see no reason to believe that labor is being compensated 
in other sorts of ways. 
EMPLOYEES & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 71 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) 
(discussing the asymmetric nature of the canonical principal-agent problem). 
 20. Although there is significant evidence to prove a declining trend in labor’s share of GDP, 
there has been a marked decline in the quality of labor’s share. Wages play a less prominent role in 
employee remuneration, being replaced by much more speculative pension benefits, health insurance, 
and stock bonus plans. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL 
YEARS 2006–2015, at fig.2-12 (2004), at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6060&sequence=3. 
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